CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-13481

MediumCVSS 5.4
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.24%

16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs

Summary

The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. It fails to validate the TLV data length before reading and writing a 10-byte ptp_timestamp structure, causing an out-of-bounds read and write of 8 bytes. The vulnerability is reachable by an adjacent attacker on the local PTP segment when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.

Risk Assessment

The risk includes unauthorized read of adjacent in-object bytes (minor information exposure) and corruption of the parsed management TIME value. There is no crash or remote code execution, but it may disrupt services relying on precise PTP time.

Recommendation

Apply the vendor-provided fix immediately, which adds a length check (if (length < sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp))) before the cast. If the fix is unavailable, consider temporarily disabling PTP (CONFIG_PTP) or restricting trusted peers on the PTP segment.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv->data to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check. The length passed in is the management data size (tlv->length - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv->length > 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled. The over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv->data lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption. The fix adds if (length < sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS