CVE-2026-98068

Niskie ryzyko· EPSS 7%

Opublikowano: 25/09/2026(UTC)Zaktualizowano: 19/10/2026(UTC)Przetłumaczono: 25/09/2026(UTC)NVD NIST

Prawdopodobieństwo exploitacji (EPSS)

Niskie ryzyko

0.18%

Percentyl 7 - wyżej niż 7% wszystkich znanych CVE

Streszczenie

W jądrze Linux w podsystemie RDS (Reliable Datagram Sockets) wykryto podatność, w której funkcja rds_conn_shutdown() może skonsumować współbieżne wywołanie drop, prowadząc do zakleszczenia ścieżki połączenia w stanie RDS_CONN_DOWN. Problem dotyczy wyścigu między zamykaniem połączenia a akceptacją nowego gniazda, co może skutkować brakiem poprawnego zakończenia sesji i narastaniem kolejki odbiorczej.

Ocena ryzyka

Organizacja może doświadczyć niedostępności usług korzystających z RDS (np. Oracle RDS) z powodu zakleszczonych połączeń, które nie są zamykane, co prowadzi do wyczerpania zasobów i potencjalnych ataków DoS.

Rekomendacja

Zaleca się natychmiastowe zastosowanie oficjalnej łatki jądra Linux zawierającej poprawkę dla CVE-2026-98068 oraz monitorowanie biuletynów bezpieczeństwa dystrybucji w celu aktualizacji systemów.

Inne podatności w Linux kernel

Zobacz wszystkie

Oryginalny opis (angielski, źródło NVD)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail the shutdown into a noisy error path. But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN is a no-op. For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released. It is not harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first. rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper. Its path claim in rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -> RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR. The accept then installs the freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued teardown - which sampled tc->t_sock before this socket existed - is still running. rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should reap the socket it just installed. If the in-flight shutdown's final transition consumes that drop's RDS_CONN_ERROR, the queued pass finds the path in RDS_CONN_DOWN and does nothing. The installed socket is never torn down: it sits established with its callbacks armed and its rds_tcp_connection on rds_tcp_tc_list, the peer sees a connection that nothing ever reads, and the path is wedged in RDS_CONN_DOWN until some later event drops it again. Reproduced with widened race windows as an ever-growing receive queue on a socket owned by a path stuck in RDS_CONN_DOWN, with the peer's send path wedged behind it. Make the final transition only DISCONNECTING -> DOWN. If it fails because the path is in RDS_CONN_ERROR, a drop raced the teardown: cancel the reconnect timer and clear RDS_RECONNECT_PENDING - the one piece of the skipped tail that must not be left behind - and return, letting the pass the drop queued finish the job: it tears down whatever attached to the path in the meantime, completes the transition to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and re-arms the reconnect from its own tail. The timer quiesce in that branch matters because the racing drop does not always queue that pass: rds_conn_path_drop() returns without queueing when a destroy is pending - exactly the situation during a netns teardown or module unload, when a FIN on the dying socket is processed while rds_conn_path_destroy() flushes cp_down_w. If the flushed pass is the one that takes this return, no later pass exists, and rds_conn_path_destroy() would find cp_conn_w still armed (WARN_ON) and then free a path whose reconnect timer can still fire. With the cancel in the branch, every exit of a shutdown pass leaves the timer quiesced no matter which pass completes the transition. The FIN case keeps making progress, one pass later and still without noisy logging. Any other state keeps today's rds_conn_path_error() handling; no current cp_state writer can leave a DISCONNECTING path in anything but RDS_CONN_ERROR (every other writer is a cmpxchg from a non-DISCONNECTING state), so that branch is defensive. On kernels without the preceding patches the same hazard exists with the sample-based quiesce; the fix applies there equally.

Dane podatności pochodzą z NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS