CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-79979

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.10%

1th percentile - higher than 1% of all known CVEs

Summary

The arm64 MMU backend's invalidate_tlb_page() only invalidated TLB entries for ASID 0, while memory domains use ASIDs starting at 1. As a result, after a page was evicted via demand paging, a user thread retained a valid translation to the freed frame, allowing read and write access to data later placed there.

Risk Assessment

Unprivileged code in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then access stale mappings, obtaining read/write access to kernel data, another domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation, enabling information disclosure and memory corruption up to full system compromise.

Recommendation

Update to a version containing the fix that switches TLBI VAE1 to TLBI VAAE1, which invalidates entries for all ASIDs and both global and non-global entries. If updating is not possible, consider disabling CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING or restricting execution of untrusted user-space code.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt >> 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain's cached translation therefore survived the invalidation. All callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page — a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() — retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID. Unprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system. The fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS