CVE-2025-64526
MediumCVSS 5.3Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk41th percentile - higher than 41% of all known CVEs
Summary
In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an email field (e.g. /auth/local, /auth/reset-password, /auth/change-password). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary email value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.
Risk Assessment
The vulnerability allows bypassing rate limiting and conducting brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks against user accounts, potentially leading to account takeover. The risk is high because the attack requires no authentication and is easy to automate.
Recommendation
Upgrade Strapi to version 5.45.0 or later, which introduces an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and falls back to a fixed identifier-less key on all other routes. Until patched, consider adding extra rate limiting at the reverse proxy or WAF level for authentication routes.
Other vulnerabilities in Strapi
See all- CVE-2026-27886High
Strapi is an open-source content management system that in versions from 4.0.0 to prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the `where` query parameter to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields in the `admin_users` table, allowing for administrative account takeover.
- CVE-2023-22894MediumActively exploited
Strapi through 4.5.5 allows attackers with admin panel access to discover sensitive user details by exploiting the query filter. Attackers can filter users by columns containing sensitive information and infer values from API responses. Super admin can discover password hashes and password reset tokens of all users.
- CVE-2026-108114Medium
Strapi versions 5.47.0 through 5.57.0 contain an improper authorization vulnerability that allows admin API tokens to retain all-field Content Manager access after the owner's role is field-restricted. Because reconcileTokenPermissionsToUserCeiling ignores token permissions with omitted or null fields, token holders can keep reading content fields an administrator removed from the role.
- CVE-2026-90561High
Strapi versions 4.x through 4.26.2 and 5.x before 5.48.1 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the content manager WYSIWYG preview component that fails to strip script tags from rich text. An Author-role user can store malicious script tags in rich text fields that execute in an Editor or Super Admin's session when the preview pane is expanded, enabling account takeover.
- CVE-2026-57997Medium
The Strapi users-permissions plugin fails to restrict JWT algorithms when plugin::users-permissions.jwt.algorithm is not explicitly configured, allowing acceptance of HS384 and HS512 tokens alongside HS256. Attackers possessing the jwtSecret can mint tokens with non-standard HMAC variants to bypass algorithm restrictions and weaken authentication controls.
- CVE-2026-22707Medium
In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, the Upload plugin's Content API endpoints did not enforce administrator-configured MIME type restrictions. An authenticated user with Content API upload permission could upload disallowed file types, including HTML and SVG, potentially leading to admin session hijack in default deployments.
- CVE-2026-22706Medium
In Strapi prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate existing refresh-token sessions by default, because the invalidation step depended on a caller-supplied deviceId. An attacker with a previously obtained refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, maintaining unauthorized access for up to 30 days. The patch in 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens on every password change and reset.
- CVE-2026-22599High
In Strapi (4.x before 4.26.1 and 5.x before 5.33.2), an authenticated administrator could inject arbitrary SQL statements through the `column.defaultTo` attribute in the Content-Type Builder write API by setting it as a tuple `[value, { isRaw: true }]`. Depending on the database engine, this enabled arbitrary file read, denial of service, or remote code execution against the database server.
- CVE-2025-53092Medium
Strapi versions prior to 5.20.0 contain a CORS misconfiguration vulnerability in default installations. By default, Strapi reflects the Origin header value in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header without proper validation or whitelisting, allowing an attacker-controlled site to send credentialed requests to the Strapi backend. The vulnerability is fixed in version 5.20.0.
- CVE-2025-3930Medium
Strapi uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for authentication. After logout or account deactivation, the JWT is not invalidated, allowing an attacker who has stolen or intercepted the token to reuse it until its expiration date (default 30 days). The existence of the /admin/renew-token endpoint allows indefinite renewal of near-expiration tokens, further increasing the impact. This issue is fixed in version 5.24.1.
Original NVD description (English source)
Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS