CVE-2023-40590
HighCVSS 7.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk37th percentile - higher than 37% of all known CVEs
Summary
CVE-2023-40590 affects the GitPython library, which can execute a malicious `git` program from a local repository if the user runs GitPython from that directory. This issue primarily occurs on Windows systems where Python improperly resolves paths to executables.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can trick a user into downloading a repository with a malicious `git` file, allowing arbitrary command execution. The lack of current fixes for Windows users increases the risk.
Recommendation
It is recommended to set an absolute path for the `git` program on Windows systems and to inform users to avoid running GitPython from untrusted repositories.
Other vulnerabilities in GitPython
See all- CVE-2026-44244High
GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. In versions prior to 3.1.49, the GitConfigParser.set_value() method did not validate values for newlines, allowing for the injection of malicious paths into Git configuration.
- CVE-2026-44243High
GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability allowed attackers to manipulate files outside the repository's .git directory due to insufficient validation of reference paths.
- CVE-2026-42284High
GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. In versions prior to 3.1.47, the _clone() function improperly validates multi_options, allowing malicious hooks to be executed during repository cloning.
- CVE-2026-42215High
GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. From version 3.1.30 to before version 3.1.47, the library blocks dangerous Git options, but equivalent Python kwargs can bypass that check, leading to arbitrary command execution.
- GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239High
In GitPython, Remote.pull() forwards its positional refspec argument directly to the git pull child process while its unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments. An application that passes attacker-influenced data as the refspec (e.g., a user-supplied branch name) may allow injection of unsafe options.
- GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhwHigh
GitPython spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url) (raises UnsafeProtocolError for <transport>:: remote-helper URLs) and Git.check_unsafe_options(...) (raises UnsafeOptionError for denylisted options). The description indicates the rollout did not cover all code paths.
- GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7High
This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made Actor._from_string regex-free, but parse_actor_and_date still runs _re_actor_epoch on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epo...
- GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644wMedium
GitPython 3.1.61 (and main) has a gap in git/objects/submodule/base.py — the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name(), but the description does not fully specify the scope. The code is identical in 3.1.61 and main.
- GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgrHigh
GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the "option" label; it does not reject =, #, ;, [, ], or whitespace in an option name. write_section writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as sshCommand = touch <cmd> can inject configuration.
- GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58Medium
GitPython's public Submodule.move() API verifies that its destination is lexically inside the parent repository, but does not reject symbolic links in the destination's intermediate components before filesystem operations. On systems that check out Git symlinks, an untrusted repository may exploit this.
Original NVD description (English source)
GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. When resolving a program, Python/Windows look for the current working directory, and after that the PATH environment. GitPython defaults to use the `git` command, if a user runs GitPython from a repo has a `git.exe` or `git` executable, that program will be run instead of the one in the user's `PATH`. This is more of a problem on how Python interacts with Windows systems, Linux and any other OS aren't affected by this. But probably people using GitPython usually run it from the CWD of a repo. An attacker can trick a user to download a repository with a malicious `git` executable, if the user runs/imports GitPython from that directory, it allows the attacker to run any arbitrary commands. There is no fix currently available for windows users, however there are a few mitigations. 1: Default to an absolute path for the git program on Windows, like `C:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.EXE` (default git path installation). 2: Require users to set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` environment variable on Windows systems. 3: Make this problem prominent in the documentation and advise users to never run GitPython from an untrusted repo, or set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` env var to an absolute path. 4: Resolve the executable manually by only looking into the `PATH` environment variable.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS