GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr

GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. In versions prior to 3.1.49, the GitConfigParser.set_value() method did not validate values for newlines, allowing for the injection of malicious paths into Git configuration.

GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability allowed attackers to manipulate files outside the repository's .git directory due to insufficient validation of reference paths.

GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. In versions prior to 3.1.47, the _clone() function improperly validates multi_options, allowing malicious hooks to be executed during repository cloning.

GitPython is a Python library used to interact with Git repositories. From version 3.1.30 to before version 3.1.47, the library blocks dangerous Git options, but equivalent Python kwargs can bypass that check, leading to arbitrary command execution.

GitPython spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url) (raises UnsafeProtocolError for <transport>:: remote-helper URLs) and Git.check_unsafe_options(...) (raises UnsafeOptionError for denylisted options). The description indicates the rollout did not cover all code paths.

This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made Actor._from_string regex-free, but parse_actor_and_date still runs _re_actor_epoch on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epo...

In GitPython, Remote.pull() forwards its positional refspec argument directly to the git pull child process while its unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments. An application that passes attacker-influenced data as the refspec (e.g., a user-supplied branch name) may allow injection of unsafe options.

GitPython 3.1.61 (and main) has a gap in git/objects/submodule/base.py — the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name(), but the description does not fully specify the scope. The code is identical in 3.1.61 and main.

GitPython's public Submodule.move() API verifies that its destination is lexically inside the parent repository, but does not reject symbolic links in the destination's intermediate components before filesystem operations. On systems that check out Git symlinks, an untrusted repository may exploit this.

Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike other callers of that helper that handle attacker-influenced data. separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule.