CVE Vulnerability Catalog

An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability in the HTTP App Server of Progress MarkLogic Server before 11.3.6 and 12.0.3 allows a remote attacker to bypass authentication and authorization checks, hijack a legitimate user's session, or capture credentials. The vulnerability occurs when a crafted HTTP request containing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers causes a reverse proxy and MarkLogic Server to interpret request boundaries differently.

An improper privilege management vulnerability in the REST API document patch operation of Progress MarkLogic Server before 11.3.6 and 12.0.3 allows an authenticated user with a low-privileged REST role to escalate privileges and execute privileged operations against the Security database.

An improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability in the SAML authentication module of Progress MarkLogic Server before 11.3.6 and 12.0.3 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication and impersonate any user, including administrators. This vulnerability affects deployments with SAML single sign-on enabled.

An improper privilege management vulnerability in the SQL, SPARQL, and Optic REST query interfaces of Progress MarkLogic Server before 11.3.6 and 12.0.3 allows an authenticated user with a low-privileged REST role to escalate privileges to administrator. This enables execution of privileged operations and unauthorized data access.

Apache Answer through version 2.0.1 has insufficient session expiration: administrative API keys remain usable after the owning administrator is demoted or the account is marked inactive, suspended, or deleted, allowing continued access until the keys are explicitly removed.

Improper Privilege Management in Google SecOps (Chronicle SOAR) versions prior to 6.3.85 on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated attacker to escalate privileges to system-level administrative access using a crafted internal authentication header. This vulnerability was patched with version 6.3.85, and no customer action is needed.

The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089) with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary.

rust-iot-platform allows creating a 'calc rule' via POST /calc-rule/create (api/src/controller/calc_rule_router.rs) containing an arbitrary field. This route does not take the AuthToken request guard used elsewhere in the application, making it reachable without authentication.

In rust-iot-platform, the AuthToken request-guard implementation (api/src/main.rs) only checks whether the Authorization HTTP header is present, and never validates its value against any session, token store, or signature. Any request carrying an arbitrary non-empty Authorization header (e.g. ) satisfies the guard, granting access to every endpoint protected only by this request guard.

OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program function parses directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) files and writes referenced content without validating that the file path stays within the ./core directory. A path-validation function exists but is never invoked from compile_program.

microtar's mtar_write_file_header and mtar_write_dir_header functions (src/microtar.c) copy a caller-supplied entry name into the 100-byte field of a stack-allocated mtar_header_t via strcpy(h.name, name), with no check that strlen(name) is less than 100 before the copy.

In the LINUXTCP port of FreeModbus, there is an off-by-one bounds check in xMBPortTCPPool (demo/LINUXTCP/port/porttcp.c). The check uses a strict greater-than comparison instead of greater-than-or-equal against the 263-byte MB_TCP_BUF_SIZE limit.

In IoTSharp, BlobStorageController.cs lacks the [Authorize] attribute applied to every other controller, and no global authorization FallbackPolicy is configured in Startup.cs, leaving its Upload/Download/List/Modify/Delete endpoints reachable by unauthenticated remote attackers.

nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds stack read leading to a wild-pointer write in nmbs_read_device_identification_basic / recv_read_device_identification_res in nanomodbus.c. A fixed 3-element stack array order[3] = {0,1,2} maps object IDs to buffer indices. The server-supplied object_id field (0-255, read directly from the wire) is used without any bounds check as buf_index = order[object_id].

nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds write in the Modbus server-side handle_read_file_record function (FC 0x14, Read File Record) in nanomodbus.c. The function validates that the total request size does not exceed 245 bytes and that each sub-request's record_length is at most 124, but it never validates the CUMULATIVE response size across all sub-requests before processing them.

The vulnerability in login.php of Inventory-Management-System-PHP consists of constructing the authentication query by directly concatenating raw POST parameters, without any escaping or parameterization. This allows authentication bypass via SQL injection, e.g., email=' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1-- -.

DjangoCRM ships with its Django SECRET_KEY hardcoded directly in the committed webcrm/settings.py rather than read from an environment variable. Since this key is used for session signing, CSRF token generation, and password reset tokens, anyone who reads the public repository can forge valid session cookies (including for the superadmin account), forge CSRF tokens, and forge password reset tokens, achieving full account takeover.

In Miantang/IoT-PHP, in index.php, the POST /userlogin route reads the password directly from ['pwd'] without sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database.

In IOTSmartHome, the checkCookie function in gui/login.php builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode, which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string.

Zbtlink router firmware ships an embedded remote-control implant, ENDLESSDOORS, present in every published build across the product line. It is the open-source ycsunjane/rctl tool built in as an OpenWrt package (librctl.so), started at boot and run as root under the process name kworker. It opens no listening port; it phones home over cleartext TCP to a hardcoded command-and-control server (command channel 7000, interactive-shell callback 7001) with no authentication and no transport encryption, re-attempting contact roughly every 35 seconds. Its command handler passes any received string to popen() as uid=0, and a reserved rctlbash command returns an interactive root shell. Because the channel is unauthenticated and cleartext, control is not limited to whoever planted it: any party that answers at the C2 address, occupies the network path (DNS or route hijack), or acquires the hardcoded fallback domain obtains unauthenticated remote code execution as root.