CVE-2026-96455
HighCVSS 8.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs
Summary
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP endpoint POST /apps/install with no authentication whatsoever. The endpoint accepts the name of a public Hugging Face Space, downloads it and installs it as a Python package, which executes attacker-chosen code. On the wireless version the daemon binds to 0.0.0.0, so any host on the same LAN can install and run arbitrary code on the robot.
Risk Assessment
An attacker on the same LAN can install and run arbitrary code on the robot without credentials, gaining full control over it. The CORS change in version 1.8.2 does not fix this, as CORS is enforced only by browsers and direct HTTP requests from another machine bypass it entirely.
Recommendation
Do not connect the Reachy Mini robot to untrusted LANs until a fix is released. Restrict access to the /apps/install endpoint via firewall rules or authentication at a reverse proxy, and monitor vendor updates.
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Original NVD description (English source)
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

