CVE-2026-79981
MediumCVSS 6.5Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the DNS stub resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c), the UDP socket is bound only once at resolver context initialisation, so the source port stays constant for the lifetime of the context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier varies. This violates RFC 5452 section 9.2 and lets an attacker with UDP reachability guess just the identifier and inject a forged reply. The fix draws a fresh source port before each query (CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT, default y).
Risk Assessment
An attacker on the same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment (or with a routable device address) can poison DNS replies and force a name to resolve to an attacker-chosen address; with caching enabled the forged record persists for its attacker-chosen TTL. Applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected.
Recommendation
Update Zephyr to a version containing the fix and ensure CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT is enabled (default y). Restrict UDP reachability to the device and enforce TLS certificate validation for resolved endpoints.
Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr DNS resolver
Original NVD description (English source)
The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier. The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port. An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected. The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

