CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-79976

HighCVSS 7.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.21%

10th percentile - higher than 10% of all known CVEs

Summary

The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding (mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c) fails to clear the selected register (b->reg_addr) and data-phase flag (b->rxtx) on I2C STOP. A bus controller can use two ordinary transactions to make mctp_bus_rx() run with a NULL buffer or to dereference b->tx_pkt->end after it was cleared, triggering an exception in the I2C target interrupt handler and a device reset or halt.

Risk Assessment

Any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (e.g. compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or the BMC) can cause a denial of service. On parts where address 0 is readable, impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer reaching the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets, with no confidentiality or integrity boundary crossed.

Recommendation

Update the kernel/system to a version containing the fix that resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx on every STOP. If the feature is not needed, disable CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET (only builds with the experimental CONFIG_MCTP are affected).

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop(). A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped. The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed. The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS