CVE-2026-74836
HighCVSS 8.7Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk50th percentile - higher than 50% of all known CVEs
Summary
A vulnerability in the Bandit library (Elixir) allows an unauthenticated attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes via connection-level flow control. When a response exceeds the connection send window (default 65,535 bytes), the stream process blocks forever, and the queue is never purged, leading to resource exhaustion.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can remotely and without authentication cause resource exhaustion (processes, memory, connections), resulting in denial of service (DoS) and potentially affecting application availability.
Recommendation
Immediately upgrade the Bandit library to version 1.12.5 or later, which includes a fix that bounds the wait time at the connection level.
Other vulnerabilities in Bandit
See all- CVE-2026-116078High
In the Elixir bandit library from 0.3.1 before 1.14.1, the HTTP/2 request body reader lacks resource limits, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a request body sent as many 1-byte DATA frames. Routes whose Plug reads the request body, including those behind Plug.Parsers, are affected.
- CVE-2026-115269High
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/2 request body reader of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to hold stream processes open indefinitely via WINDOW_UPDATE or empty SETTINGS frames sent while a Plug reads the request body. Affects bandit from 1.4.0 before 1.14.0.
- CVE-2026-114216Medium
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in the HTTP/1.1 chunked body reader of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle a second request past a front-end proxy via a chunk extension that contains a bare LF. The chunked reader in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex takes the chunk-size line to be everything up to the first CRLF and discards everything after ; without checking it against the RFC 9112 chunk-ext grammar, so bare LF, bare CR and other control bytes pass. A proxy that ends the size line at a bare LF reads 2;\nxx\r\n40\r\n... as one request whose second chunk holds a GET /admin, while Bandit ends the body early and dispatches GET /admin as a separate pipelined request. Deployments without such a proxy in front of Bandit are not affected.
- CVE-2026-114213High
A vulnerability in the Bandit (Elixir) library allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented WebSocket message made of many 1-byte continuation frames. The fragment reassembly does not limit the number of fragments, so memory usage can greatly exceed the configured limit.
- CVE-2026-113436High
An inefficient algorithmic complexity vulnerability in Bandit's HTTP header integer parser allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to consume server CPU by sending a Content-Length value or Host/:authority port made of thousands of digits. The parser builds the number digit by digit without a length limit, resulting in quadratic time complexity.
- CVE-2026-111103High
An improper cleanup on thrown exception vulnerability in Bandit's HTTP/2 handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass per-connection resource limits by sending multiple frames in a single TCP write, one of which raises a stream error. The connection state rolls back, causing streams to be forgotten and limits to be exceeded.
- CVE-2026-111101High
An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in Bandit's HTTP/1.1 chunked body reader allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory and CPU via a request body made of many 1-byte chunks. The reader keeps every chunk as a separate term without limiting the number of chunks.
- CVE-2026-110499High
An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in Bandit's HTTP/2 implementation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to grow per-connection memory and CPU cost without bound via a large SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE. The HPACK encoder table is resized to the client-advertised size without a server-side cap, causing O(N²) CPU cost for N responses.
- CVE-2026-110314Medium
Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security vulnerability in the WebSocket connection handling of mtrudel bandit allows a remote client to keep running WebSock handler code after the server has stopped its connection, via data frames sent after ignoring the server's Close frame. When a WebSock callback returns {:stop, ...}, Bandit.WebSocket.Connection calls terminate/2, sends Close and shuts down the write side, but keeps the connection process running in a :closing state. handle_frame/3 and handle_info/3 never check that state, so later frames still reach handle_in/2 and later messages reach handle_info/2, with the state from the stop tuple, until the client sends Close, TCP drops or the idle timeout fires. A client refused in init/1 after a failed token check could still run an admin-only action.
- CVE-2026-109584High
An improper handling of highly compressed data (data amplification) vulnerability in Bandit's HTTP/2 implementation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a small HPACK-compressed HEADERS block. The block stores a large cookie value in the HPACK dynamic table and references it many times, causing excessive memory allocation.
Original NVD description (English source)
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream's response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), Bandit.HTTP2.Connection queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in pending_sends and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client RST_STREAM for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound. Each stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each. This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

