CVE-2026-63399

In Coop before 1.0.2, addAccessibleQueuesForUser and removeAccessibleQueuesForUser accepted arbitrary queueId and userId values without organization scoping. An authenticated user belonging to one organization and holding MRT queue-edit permission could grant or revoke another organization's users' access to manual review queues. The existing queue-edit permission check did not bind the supplied identifiers to the caller's organization. The attacker could not read the other organization's queues or jobs, so this issue did not disclose confidential data.

Coop is an open source review and moderation tool from ROOST. Prior to 1.0.2, `resetPasswordForToken` updates the password row without invalidating database-backed sessions. An attacker who has acquired a password and established a session retains access even after the legitimate user resets the password, leaving the compromised account under attacker control until the session expires at its `30-day` maximum age.

In Coop prior to 1.0.2, the SAML strategy verify callback resolved the authenticated user by email alone using kyselyUserFindByEmail, without binding the lookup to the organization in /saml/login/:orgId/callback. An attacker who administers an organization and controls its SAML IdP signing key can submit an assertion for a victim email to another organization's callback when that target organization has registered the same signing certificate.

In Coop prior to 1.0.0, an unauthenticated actor can query Query.allOrgs through /api/v1/graphql on a publicly accessible deployment and obtain data for all organizations, including IDs, names, email addresses, website URLs and on-call alert email addresses. The usersWhoCanReviewEveryQueue field also exposes reviewing users' IDs, email addresses, names, roles, permissions and creation dates.