CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-61546

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

AnkiMCP prior to version 0.21.0 globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener on 127.0.0.1:3141, with no bearer token, API key, or strict Host/Origin allowlist. A victim visiting a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to initialize MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates.

Risk Assessment

An attacker can remotely, without LAN position or a local process, read the victim's Anki collection and create or modify notes and decks. Destructive tools are hidden by default, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations.

Recommendation

Update AnkiMCP to version 0.21.0 or later, which fixes this issue. Until then, disable the HTTP listener or restrict access to it, and consider enabling authentication and strict Host/Origin allowlists.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

AnkiMCP is an Anki addon that implements an MCP server, enabling AI assistants to interact with the Anki flashcard application. Prior to version 0.21.0, `anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py` globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection through `TransportSecuritySettings` with `enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False`, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener. The defaults in `anki_mcp_server/config.py` enable `http_enabled` on `127.0.0.1:3141`, with an empty `http_path` selecting the root endpoint. No bearer token, API key, session secret, strict `Host` allowlist or strict `Origin` allowlist is enforced before `initialize`, `tools/list` and `tools/call` reach MCP dispatch. A victim who visits a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to `initialize` MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates. The attacker needs neither LAN position nor a local process. Available operations depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools are hidden unless `enabled_destructive_tools` is opted into, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations. The reported harness confirms real MCP tool dispatch with substituted Anki bridge responses rather than demonstrating destructive changes to a real collection. Disabling protection for tunnels/proxies also disables it for the normal loopback configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.0.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS