CVE-2026-55834
MediumCVSS 4.3Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk19th percentile - higher than 19% of all known CVEs
Summary
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, the client-side path in authorize does not block all dangerous URL schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can exploit this for phishing or OIDC state manipulation, potentially leading to data theft or account takeover.
Recommendation
Update Pocket ID to version 2.9.0 or later.
Other vulnerabilities in Pocket ID
See all- CVE-2026-62662High
From 1.11.0 until 2.10.0, createTokenFromClientCredentials in backend/internal/service/oidc_service.go accepts the client-controlled resource parameter and embeds it directly in the access token aud claim without validating that the audience is registered or that the requesting client may access it. Any authenticated OIDC client can therefore obtain a Pocket ID-signed token naming another client or an arbitrary audience.
- CVE-2026-115770Critical
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification binds an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true.
Original NVD description (English source)
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS