CVE-2026-54061

In Dgraph prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval.

Dgraph before version 25.3.8 in maybeQuoteArg in graphql/resolve/query_rewriter.go passes regexp filter strings into generated DQL without proper quoting or validation, allowing injection of DQL operators, disclosure of unintended nodes, or expansion of modification and deletion targets. The issue is fixed in version 25.3.8.

In Dgraph prior to version 25.3.4, a DQL injection vulnerability was found in the `checkUserPassword` GraphQL query. User-supplied password values are interpolated directly into a DQL `checkpwd()` query via `fmt.Sprintf` without any escaping or parameterization. An attacker can inject a password containing a double-quote character to break out of the DQL string literal and append arbitrary DQL query blocks.

Dgraph is a distributed GraphQL database. Existing audit logs are vulnerable to brute force attacks due to nonce collisions — the first 12 bytes come from a baseIv and the last 4 bytes from the length of the encrypted log line, causing the same nonce to be reused many times. All audit logs generated by Dgraph versions <v23.0.0 are affected.