CVE-2026-48815

In sigstore-js prior to version 0.7.1, getRegistryCredentials() reads credentials from the Docker config file and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key contains the target registry string. Because this is a substring match rather than an exact host match, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for and transmitted to a different registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key.

In sigstore-js prior to 0.7.2, packages/oci/src/registry.ts contains a RegistryClient.signIn() method that stores registry Authorization and Docker configuration headers as defaults on a shared HTTP client, while RegistryClient.uploadBlob() sends a fresh PUT to an absolute blob-upload Location supplied by the registry without checking that its origin or scheme matches the registry. A malicious or compromised registry can therefore direct a user pushing an artifact through attachArtifactToImage() to an attacker-controlled host and receive the registry bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom authentication headers. Version 0.7.2 fixes the issue by separating registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sending them only to the registry origin.

A vulnerability in sigstore-js (versions prior to 3.1.1) allows an attacker to manipulate the transparency-log timestamp for inclusionProof-only entries in v0.2 bundles. Since the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind the timestamp, an attacker can influence certificate validity and timestamp threshold verification decisions.

A vulnerability in sigstore-js (versions prior to 3.2.1) allows mutation of the payload type after signing without invalidating the signature, breaking the type-binding guarantee of DSSE. The preAuthEncoding function uses Node.js ASCII encoding, enabling manipulation of the payloadType field.