CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-31707

HighCVSS 7.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.13%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, ksmbd's ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size by adding or multiplying attacker-controlled fields (payload_sz, ngroups) to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. This can cause an integer overflow that bypasses the size check, after which downstream consumers trust the unverified length in memcpy/kmemdup. The flaw is the response-side analogue of an earlier request-side fix.

Risk Assessment

An attacker able to influence ksmbd daemon responses (e.g., by compromising or impersonating the daemon) can trigger the integer overflow and cause out-of-bounds memory operations, leading to kernel memory corruption, a system crash, or potentially kernel code execution.

Recommendation

Update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix for CVE-2026-31707 (stable/mainline branch with the commit ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()). If ksmbd is not used, consider disabling the module to reduce the attack surface.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel (ksmbd)

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow: KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed. This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS