CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-29050

MediumCVSS 6.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.14%

3th percentile - higher than 3% of all known CVEs

Summary

melange (a tool for building apk packages using declarative pipelines) from version 0.32.0 to before 0.43.4 allows an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file to set pipeline[].uses to a value containing ../ sequences or an absolute path. The (*Compiled).compilePipeline function in pkg/build/compile.go passed uses directly to filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml") without validation, so the resolved path could escape --pipeline-dir and read any YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is interpreted as a melange pipeline and its runs: block is executed via /bin/sh -c in the build sandbox, this allowed shell commands from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing review. Fixed in melange v0.43.4 (commit 5829ca4).

Risk Assessment

An attacker able to influence melange configuration (e.g., via pull-request-driven CI) can execute arbitrary shell commands in the build sandbox and read arbitrary YAML files, bypassing code review.

Recommendation

Upgrade melange to version 0.43.4 or later; until then, only run melange build against trusted configurations and manually review pipeline[].uses values.

Other vulnerabilities in melange

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. Starting in version 0.32.0 and prior to version 0.43.4, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its `runs:` block is executed via `/bin/sh -c` in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition. The issue is fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects `uses` values that are absolute paths or contain `..`, and verifies (via `filepath.Rel` after `filepath.Clean`) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory. As a workaround, only run `melange build` against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of `pipeline[].uses` values and reject any containing `..` or leading `/`.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS