CVE-2026-18417
MediumCVSS 6.5Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs
Summary
In Zephyr RTOS, a vulnerability exists in the BSD socket layer where an asynchronous error was stored in the user_data field of the network context, which for listening TCP sockets is used to store a pointer to the parent context. In v4.3.0, after an interface-down event, the accept callback was not disarmed, leading to reuse of the poisoned value as a pointer and writes to an invalid address, causing a kernel fatal error (device crash or reset).
Risk Assessment
An attacker who can repeatedly force a network interface down (e.g., by disrupting a wireless link) or with local/physical access can cause a denial of service (device crash or reset). The vulnerability does not allow direct code execution but can be used to destabilize the system.
Recommendation
Immediately update Zephyr RTOS to a version containing the fix (v4.3.1 or later, or a version with commit 269cb8823d3 / 913fae5169425550f2364655298fceb79b320066). If updating is not possible, restrict access to network interfaces and monitor link-down events.
Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS
See all- CVE-2026-82962Medium
A vulnerability in ethernet_fill_header() in the Zephyr RTOS network stack prepends the Ethernet header in place via net_buf_push without verifying that the packet has sufficient headroom. Packets allocated by a different L2 (e.g., 802.15.4/OpenThread, PPP) and handed to Ethernet through routing or tunnelling have too little (usually zero) headroom, causing an out-of-bounds write. In builds without CONFIG_ASSERT and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING this results in memory corruption.
- CVE-2026-19595Medium
A vulnerability in the Zephyr RTOS syscall verifier: z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() validated its output parameters buff and buff_len with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() instead of K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(). This allows an unprivileged user-mode thread to invoke the syscall with pointers to read-only memory, causing a supervisor-mode store outside the permitted region or a kernel fault that halts or reboots the device.
- CVE-2026-19940Medium
A vulnerability in the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway (HFP AG) implementation in Zephyr RTOS causes corruption of the kernel timeout list. By sending AT+CIND? and quickly reconnecting, a remote attacker can trigger a system-wide fault or hang.
- CVE-2026-19736High
The NXP MCUX TRNG entropy driver in Zephyr (drivers/entropy/entropy_mcux_trng.c) passes the caller's byte count directly to the SDK routine TRNG_GetRandomData(), which on i.MX RT5xx/RT6xx parts always copies whole 32-bit words and rounds entropy draws up to a multiple of 128 bytes. A request length not a multiple of four causes an underflow in the SDK's buffer-full check, leading to an overflow of up to 127 bytes past the caller's buffer.
- CVE-2026-19575High
A vulnerability in Zephyr RTOS affects the user-mode verification handler z_vrfy_device_deinit() in kernel/device.c, which validated its dev argument with K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT(dev, K_OBJ_ANY). Because k_object_validate() short-circuits type comparison for K_OBJ_ANY, the check only verified that the pointer was the base address of some kernel object the calling thread was granted, without comparing the object's actual type. This allows a local user-mode thread to pass a thread stack object (e.g., from k_thread_stack_alloc()) and achieve supervisor-mode kernel code execution.
- CVE-2026-19574High
In the ARM64 MMU back-end of Zephyr RTOS, address space identifiers (ASIDs) are assigned by a bare round-robin counter, which after wrapping past 255 possible values can hand the same ASID to a new domain while a still-live domain holds it. Because domain-private mappings are installed as non-global (MT_NG), the ASID is the only tag separating cached translations in the TLB, and the context-switch path does not flush the TLB for a duplicate reached through a third domain. As a result, user-mode threads in one domain can read and write memory belonging to another domain, defeating memory-domain isolation.
- CVE-2026-19569High
A vulnerability in the Zephyr RTOS kernel allows an unprivileged user-mode thread to perform an out-of-bounds write in kernel memory. It stems from missing overflow checks when calculating allocation sizes for dynamic kernel objects, leading to undersized heap allocations. An attacker can exploit this to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code at the kernel level.
- CVE-2026-19185High
A vulnerability was found in the system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in Zephyr RTOS, which fails to validate per-target data pointers in the i3c_ccc_payload structure. The verifier also operates on the caller's live structure, allowing another thread to modify fields between check and use. This allows an unprivileged thread to write to arbitrary kernel addresses (via read CCC) or disclose kernel memory (via write CCC), leading to privilege escalation.
- CVE-2026-18747Medium
A vulnerability in the SMP-over-console transport in Zephyr RTOS allows an unauthenticated attacker to trigger a buffer length underflow by sending a single 7-byte frame to the management console. This leads to an out-of-bounds read, potentially causing a denial of service on the MCUmgr thread or memory disclosure.
- CVE-2026-16513High
A vulnerability in the RTIO syscall verifier in Zephyr RTOS (before v4.3.0) allows an unprivileged user thread to write a pointer to controlled data at an arbitrary kernel address. The missing K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE check for the handle output parameter enables privilege escalation to kernel mode.
Original NVD description (English source)
The native BSD-socket layer recorded a pending asynchronous socket error by type-punning it into struct net_context's void user_data field (ctx->user_data = INT_TO_POINTER(-status) in zsock_accepted_cb(), zsock_received_cb(), zsock_connected_cb() and zsock_close_ctx() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_inet.c), reading it back with POINTER_TO_INT(). That same field is owned by the network stack for listening TCP contexts: net_tcp_accept() stores the parent context pointer there and the TCP core passes it back to the registered accept callback. A failed accept therefore left a small integer (an errno value) where the stack expected a struct net_context . When the network interface carrying a listening TCP socket goes down, close_tcp_conn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c invokes the accept callback with -ENETDOWN and the context's user_data. In v4.3.0 the callback was not disarmed afterwards, so a second interface-down event forwarded the previously stored errno to zsock_accepted_cb(), which dereferenced it as the parent context and performed several stores through it (sock_set_error()'s read-modify-write of socket_data, k_fifo_cancel_wait(&parent->recv_q)) — the crash described in the fix's commit message. v4.3.1 and v4.4.x carry a later change clearing conn->accept_cb after the error callback (269cb8823d3 on the v4.3 branch, 913fae5169425550f2364655298fceb79b320066 on main), which closes that repeat path; on those releases the poisoned cookie remains reachable only by a narrower race, a handshake completing alongside the interface-down still passing the stale cookie to k_fifo_put(&parent->accept_q, ...), and by getsockopt(SO_ERROR), which reads the field back unconditionally. On v4.3.0 an application that keeps a listening TCP socket open across repeated link-down events is sufficient to reach the defect; the triggering condition is a network-interface state change, not attacker-supplied packet data, so the practical attacker is one able to force the link down repeatedly (for example an adjacent attacker disrupting a wireless link) or one with local/physical access. Because both the faulting address and the stored data are fixed small constants derived from the errno value, the outcome is a wild-pointer access leading to a kernel fatal error — a denial of service (device crash or reset) rather than an attacker-directed memory corruption. The fix stores the pending error in a dedicated net_context.sock_error field and converts every producer and consumer to sock_set_error()/sock_get_error(), leaving user_data untouched. As a side effect it also stops getsockopt(SO_ERROR) — which is evaluated unconditionally — from returning the kernel address held in user_data to a userspace application.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS