CVE-2026-18414
HighCVSS 7.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs
Summary
The ADI MAX32 driver in Zephyr failed to properly validate the destination buffer size in adc_max32.c — it compared a byte count against a sample count, ignoring sizeof(uint16_t). As a result, a buffer half the required size was accepted and the driver wrote twice as many bytes as the buffer held, causing an out-of-bounds write. On builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged user-mode thread can exploit this to corrupt kernel memory.
Risk Assessment
The vulnerability allows an unprivileged user-mode thread to write past its allocated buffer into kernel memory, potentially leading to privilege escalation or denial of service. On builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, it is only a caller-side robustness defect.
Recommendation
Update Zephyr to a version containing the fix that replaces the faulty check in start_read() with a call to the shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() using sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. Until patched, avoid granting user-mode threads access to MAX32 ADC devices.
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Original NVD description (English source)
The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence. The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer. The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS