CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-110985

Low risk· EPSS 2%
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.13%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

In an Apache Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (DefaultJwtValidator), when sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is unset and no custom verification key resolver is supplied, the validator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer. The broker starts without any warning and accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set.

Risk Assessment

An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a JWT asserting any principal, including configured superusers, and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected.

Recommendation

For every listener/mechanism using OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class. From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0, a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException.

Other vulnerabilities in Apache Kafka

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set. Impact: A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default).

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS