CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-107566

MediumCVSS 6.5
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

7th percentile - higher than 7% of all known CVEs

Summary

Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (versions 6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (versions 6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to modify From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender, and DKIM-Signature headers and then redirect messages, causing the server to send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a hosted domain. This enables forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC.

Risk Assessment

An attacker with a valid account can send forged messages in the name of any address at hosted domains, with valid DKIM signatures, potentially leading to phishing, domain reputation damage, and DMARC bypass. They can also alter and re-sign messages from other senders if the server signs for their domains.

Recommendation

Update hMailServer to a version later than 6.3.6, which contains the authorization fix for the editheader action and mail rules. Until then, restrict users from creating rules and Sieve scripts and monitor for unusual message redirects.

Other vulnerabilities in hMailServer

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to make the server send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a domain the server signs for. A Sieve script's editheader (addheader/deleteheader) could add or delete any header field except Received and Return-Path, and the server applies a script's header edits before it queues a redirect, so the redirected copy is sent as the script left it. The server signs a message's first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header wherever it signs DKIM for that domain and the message carries no signature of it. A script could therefore delete and re-add From - another account's address, or anyone's at a hosted domain - and redirect, so the server sent the message in that name and, for a hosted domain, signed it with that domain's DKIM key, a forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC; or, where another sender's domain is one the server signs for, delete the DKIM-Signature that sender's message arrived with, alter a field, and redirect, so the server re-signed the altered message as that sender's domain. editheader placed no restriction on From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature. The editheader action was introduced in 6.2.22. In the mail-rule engine, a domain's or an account's rule's Set header value action could likewise set From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature ahead of a forward or a copy, whoever the rule belonged to, so that an account acting on its own rules over COM, a domain administrator, or an API key confined to a domain (over the REST API from 6.3.4) could have the server forward or copy a message in the name of any address, signed, where that address is at a domain the server hosts with DKIM signing enabled, with that domain's key.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS