CVE-2025-59733
HighCVSS 8.7Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs
Summary
When decoding an OpenEXR file with DWAA or DWAB compression, there is an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type and size, and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R", and "A". With duplicate or unknown channels of 2-byte EXR_HALF type, pointer calculations can exceed the allocated buffer, causing an overflow.
Risk Assessment
A malicious OpenEXR file could cause a buffer overflow during decoding, potentially leading to a crash or code execution.
Recommendation
Upgrade OpenEXR to version 8.0 or later.
Other vulnerabilities in OpenEXR
See all- CVE-2017-12596High
In OpenEXR 2.2.0, a crafted image causes a heap-based buffer over-read in the hufDecode function in IlmImf/ImfHuf.cpp during exrmaketiled execution; it may result in denial of service or possibly unspecified other impact.
- CVE-2017-9115High
In OpenEXR 2.2.0, an invalid write of size 2 in the = operator function in half.h could cause the application to crash or execute arbitrary code.
- CVE-2017-9113High
In OpenEXR 2.2.0, an invalid write of size 1 in the bufferedReadPixels function in ImfInputFile.cpp could cause the application to crash or execute arbitrary code.
- CVE-2017-9111High
In OpenEXR 2.2.0, an invalid write of size 8 in the storeSSE function in ImfOptimizedPixelReading.h could cause the application to crash or execute arbitrary code.
- CVE-2026-42217Critical
OpenEXR versions from 3.0.0 to before 3.2.9, 3.3.0 to before 3.3.11, and 3.4.0 to before 3.4.11 have an issue with the readVariableLengthInteger() function that decodes a variable-length integer from untrusted EXR input without bounding the shift count. After enough continuation bytes, the code executes a left shift by 70 on a 64-bit value, leading to undefined behavior.
- CVE-2026-42216Critical
In OpenEXR versions 3.0.0 to before 3.2.9, 3.3.0 to before 3.3.11, and 3.4.0 to before 3.4.11, a vulnerability exists in the IDManifest::init() function. When reconstructing strings from a prefix-compressed representation, the code reads bytes without verifying that the current string has at least two bytes, potentially causing an out-of-bounds read.
- CVE-2026-88384Medium
OpenEXR 3.4.14 contains a NULL Pointer Dereference in the C++ attribute parsing path. A specially crafted EXR file containing an unknown-type attribute with dataSize set to zero causes the parser to create an opaque attribute with a NULL packed_data pointer. The OpaqueAttribute constructor passes the NULL pointer to memcpy() without validating the zero-size condition, resulting in undefined behavior and process termination.
- CVE-2026-68515High
OpenEXR before versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14 contains a vulnerability in the exrmultiview utility that can write past a heap allocation when combining two attacker-supplied, individually valid scanline EXR files whose union dataWindow is not aligned to one view's channel subsampling. This leads to a heap out-of-bounds write.
- CVE-2026-68514Medium
PyOpenEXR versions 3.3.0-3.3.12 and 3.4.0-3.4.13 have a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability when reading a crafted deep scanline EXR file. A specially crafted file with a 'left' channel and layer-prefixed RGB channels can cause a buffer overflow and crash.
- CVE-2026-68513High
OpenEXR versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.12 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 contain a heap buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR triggered by a channel-name key collision between literal and prefixed RGB channels. A crafted EXR file can cause an out-of-bounds write in a NumPy array during pixel decoding.
Original NVD description (English source)
When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset. The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels. If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS