CVE Catalog

CVE-2025-15284

LowCVSS 3.7
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.45%

38th percentile - higher than 38% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in the qs library (parse module) involves improper input validation — the arrayLimit option was not enforced for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This allows arrays larger than the defined limit to be created. The default parameterLimit (1000) effectively mitigates the practical impact.

Risk Assessment

The HTTP DoS risk is negligible with default settings because parameterLimit caps the number of parsed parameters. The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value, potentially leading to excessive memory and resource consumption.

Recommendation

Update the qs library to version 6.14.1 or later. If updating is not possible, ensure that parameterLimit is not set to an excessively high value.

Other vulnerabilities in qs

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS