VINCE vulnerabilities

The type=track branch authorizes only on _is_my_case(t_attach.case) and never checks VinceTrackAttachment.shared. A coordinator-uploaded case artefact that has NOT been marked shared is still retrievable by any case member who has (or is sent) its uuid — leaking not-yet-released coordinator material to vendors on the case.

In vinny/views.py, the ModifyEmailNotifications function has an IDOR vulnerability: it fetches VinceCommEmail by raw pk from URL and toggles email_function/name without checking if the record's contact belongs to the requesting group-admin. This lets a vendor admin flip notification routing (or read email/name) for another vendor's contact.

Any authenticated case participant can fetch any OTHER vendor's CaseStatement + per-vul CaseMemberStatus by supplying that member's id — test_func only checks _is_my_case, not ownership of kwargs['member']. Bypasses share_status; leaks embargoed vendor affected/not-affected + statement text cross-tenant.

VINCE versions 3.0.38 and earlier do not properly verify the From address authenticity due to encoding confusion and use the from address for automated actions such as ticket creation or updates.