Tugtainer vulnerabilities

In Tugtainer prior to version 1.30.6, an authenticated user can make the backend server send outbound HTTP requests to arbitrary user-supplied URLs through the notification test endpoint. The /settings/test_notification endpoint accepts a urls field and passes it directly to Apprise without restricting protocols, hostnames, localhost, private IP ranges, or cloud metadata addresses. This can be abused as an authenticated blind SSRF.

In Tugtainer prior to version 1.30.3, OIDC authentication can still be initiated even when OIDC_ENABLED=false. The /auth/oidc/enabled endpoint correctly reports that OIDC is disabled, but a direct request to /auth/oidc/login still starts the OIDC login flow, returns HTTP 302, sets an oidc_state cookie, and redirects to the OIDC authorization endpoint. This bypasses the intended OIDC disable switch.

Tugtainer before version 1.30.2 is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in the notification template feature. The `title_template` and `body_template` fields are rendered using an unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment`, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary OS commands as root inside the container.

Tugtainer prior to version 1.31.3 has a vulnerability where the OIDC login flow decodes the id_token without verifying signature, audience, issuer, and expiry. Extracted claims are used directly as the user_id for the session.