PIA vulnerabilities

PIA's token verification (verify_token in pia/oidc.py) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the jwks_uri contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS. An approved identity provider can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext http, from PIA's own network position, before any signature is verified.

PIA's `POST /v1/upload/sbom` endpoint accepts a Bearer JWT and checks its unverified `iss` claim against an issuer allowlist using Python's `urlparse` before performing OIDC discovery with `requests`. Because `urlparse` and `requests`/`urllib3` parse an authority string containing a backslash into different hostnames, an attacker can craft an issuer that passes the allowlist check yet drives `requests` to connect to an arbitrary attacker-chosen host.

The vulnerability in PIA uses a bare string-prefix check for the OIDC issuer allowlist instead of validating the issuer as a properly host-bounded URL. An attacker can craft an issuer that passes the prefix check but points to a controlled server. This allows an unauthenticated caller of POST /v1/upload/sbom to force outbound HTTP(S) requests to an arbitrary host and accept a JWT signed with the attacker's key.

The vulnerability in the /v1/upload/sbom endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject fake log entries by manipulating the iss claim in a JWT token. Due to disabled JWT signature verification and literal newline rendering in the log format, the attacker can create entries indistinguishable from genuine successful authentication messages.