openPDC vulnerabilities

A Modbus connection feature on openPDC accepts a caller-specified destination address and port with no restriction on which internal hosts may be targeted. An authenticated user can attempt connections to arbitrary internal network destinations, revealing which destinations are reachable. With repeated attempts, an attacker may be able to map the internal network.

The published Docker image for openPDC includes a fixed administrative credential with no forced change on first use. An attacker with network access to the management interface can authenticate using this credential and gain full administrative control of the application.

The STTP-based data publisher on openPDC accepts network connections without authentication in its default configuration. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect to this interface and exchange data with it.

The internal data publisher on openPDC accepts network connections without authentication in its default configuration. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect to this interface and retrieve the complete device and measurement topology of the system.